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An interbank market lets participants pool the risk arising from the combination of illiquid invest-
ments and random withdrawals by depositors. But it also creates the potential for one bank’s failure
to trigger off avalanches of further failures. We simulate a model of interbank lending to study the
interplay of these two effects. We show that when banks are similar in size and exposure to risk,
avalanche effects are small so that widening the interbank market leads to more stability. But as
heterogeneity increases, avalanche effects become more important. By varying the heterogeneity
and connectivity across banks, the system enters a critical regime with a power law distribution of
avalanche sizes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systemic failure in banking arises when one bank’s fail-
ure triggers off further failures. The history of modern
banking is full of examples of systemic failure at both
moderate and large scales, with the 1997 East Asian cri-
sis being the most recent example of large scale bank
failure.
Several channels through which systemic failure may
arise have been explored [1–7]. In this paper, we focus
on one channel, namely interbank lending. Interbank
lending allows banks which face temporary shortfalls in
funds to borrow from banks which have surpluses. Such
lending creates a network of credit and debt relationships
within the banking system. If one debtor bank fails, it
adversely affects the balance sheet of its creditors and
can trigger off their subsequent failures.
At the same time, interbank lending allows for the
pooling of risk arising from the stochastic pattern of de-
posits and withdrawals by each bank’s customers. With-
out interbank lending, banks might become even more
vulnerable to failure, although such failure would be id-
iosyncratic and free of the symptoms of systemic collapse.
Judgment on the effects of interbank lending for a bank-
ing system’s stability should therefore take into account
both the ex ante risk-sharing effect and the ex post sys-
temic failure effect. In this paper, we study these effects
by developing and simulating a dynamic model of a bank-
ing system, linked together through an interbank credit
market.
Our approach abstracts from the rationality of individ-
ual behavior and resembles the approach taken in the sta-
tistical mechanics of disordered systems. Episodes of sys-
temic failure in banking appear analogous to the periodic
collapses or ‘avalanches’ which arise in natural systems
in the form of earthquakes, microfracturing, epidemics,
magnetization of ferro-magnetic systems, etc. The ca-
pacity of a natural system to generate avalanches of var-
ious sizes seems to depend on certain general features,
such as the heterogeneity of the elementary constituents
of a system and the nature of interaction between them.
By analogy in a banking system, we focus on how the
individual characteristics of banks and their mutual in-
teraction on an interbank market can affect the stability
of the system.
II. THE MODEL.
Time is discrete. At the initial time, t = 0, the system
starts with N0 banks. At any subsequent time, there are
Nt banks operating in the system. The number of banks
may go down as a result of failures, but failing banks are
not replaced by new entrants.
Credit linkages between banks are defined by a connec-
tivity matrix, Jij . Jij is either one or zero; a value of one
indicates that a credit linkage exists between banks i and
j and zero indicates no relationship. Jij are randomly
chosen at the beginning of the simulation. c denotes the
probability that Jij is one for any two banks. At one ex-
treme, c = 0 represents the case of no interbank lending,
while c = 1 represents a situation in which all banks can
potentially borrow and lend from each other.
The primary purpose of a bank is to channel funds
received from depositors towards productive investment.
Deposits, Akt , and investment opportunities, ω
k
t , are ran-
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domly and independently drawn for each bank k at each
time t from Gaussian distributions with means A¯k and ω¯k
respectively, and variances A¯kσA and ω¯
kσω respectively:
Akt = |A¯
k(1 + σAǫ
1
t )|
ωkt = |ω¯
k(1 + σωǫ
2
t )|
ǫ1,2 ∼ N(0, 1)
Once tied up in investment, resources become rela-
tively illiquid; any investment made at time t fully ma-
tures only at some time t + τ . A return, ρ, is realized
at each point, t + 1, t+ 2, · · · t+ τ . ρ is exogenous and
risk-free. However, since withdrawals are unpredictable,
a bank may find it itself unable to repay its depositors
due to the illiquidity of its investment.
Each bank k starts a period, t, with cash holdings in-
herited from the past, Mkt−1. These are constituted by
Mkt−1 = A
k
t−1 +B
k
t−1 + V
k
t−1 −
τ∑
s=1
Ikt−s,
where Ak are its deposits, V k represents its equity,
Ik represents past investments and Bk represents bor-
rowings. Bk can be negative or positive and satisfies:∑N
k=1B
k = 0. Borrowing consists of one-period loans,
which require repayment in full in the period after which
they are undertaken.
Each bank receives income, ρ
∑τ−1
s=1 I
k
t−s and (1+ρ)I
k
t−τ
from investments made over the last τ periods. It then
receives a new level of Akt , as defined above. Its cash hold-
ings then adjust to reflect (Akt − A
k
t−1), the net change
in its deposits and ρ
∑τ
s=1 I
k
t−s + I
k
t−τ , the receipt of in-
comes from past investment. If the adjusted cash hold-
ings become negative, the bank can issue negotiable debt
certificates to cover any excess of payments over its cash
reserves. However, the certificates have to be redeemed
at the end of the period through borrowing from other
banks. If this is not done, the bank fails and its debt
certificates become worthless.
If a bank has borrowed in the past period, its priority
is to repay its creditors. Such payments are made in cash.
Hence, banks with cash holdings in excess of their debt
obligations, which equal (1 + rb)B
j
t−1 for bank j, make
payments to their respective creditors. Here, rb is the
exogenous interest rate on interbank borrowing.
At this point, two types of banks can be distinguished,
those with positive cash and those with negative cash.
Accordingly, they get classified as potential lenders and
potential borrowers respectively. Borrowing banks issue
demands for loans equaling their debt obligations (in-
terest plus principal) minus their current cash (which if
negative adds to their demand).
Lending banks give priority to dividend payments (to
shareholders) and investment. Dividend payments are
made for maintaining a target equity:deposit ratio, χ,
and for preventing excessive levels of capitalization. Only
banks whose adjusted cash holdings plus illiquid assets
exceed a certain fraction of their total deposits make div-
idend payments. After dividends have been paid, the
bank is assumed to undertake investment on the basis
of its available liquid resources on the one hand, and its
stochastic investment opportunity on the other. Avail-
able liquid resources comprise the bank’s current cash
minus any statutory reserve requirement imposed on it
by a regulator. If the available investment opportunity
exceeds this limit, the bank cannot exploit the full op-
portunity. It then invests upto the extent of its available
cash resources.
After investment, any excess left over is made available
to those borrowing banks with whom a credit linkage
exists. Each borrowing bank contacts each lending bank
with which it is linked in a random order. The two banks
exchange an amount of credit equal to the minimum of
the two banks’ respective demand and supply. If the
borrowing bank is left with an unfulfilled trade it contacts
another lender with which it is linked.
A borrowing bank does not receive actual funds until
it has lined up enough credit to ensure that it will not fail
during the current period. Once a bank has obtained suf-
ficient credit, funds are transferred and the cash positions
of all banks involved is updated. This continues until ei-
ther all loanable funds are exhausted or all demands for
credit are satisfied.
At this point, the process reiterates itself through the
following steps: banks which had not repaid creditors in
the first round but now have borrowed enough cash to
pay off past debt entirely, do so; these payments go to
their creditors and money holdings get updated accord-
ingly; potential borrowers and lenders are determined for
the next round; if lenders had underutilized investment
opportunities from the previous round, they make fur-
ther investment. Finally, a fresh round of borrowing and
lending takes place. The process repeats itself until reit-
eration produces no further exchange of credit.
All banks which are left with negative cash holdings
or cash holdings which fall short of their remaining debt
obligations are deemed to be in default. These banks
are removed from the system. If, at the time of closure,
a failing bank has illiquid assets in the form of invest-
ments made previously, these are liquidated at a frac-
tion, γ (which is exogenous), of their true value. The
proceeds are distributed, first to the depositors, then, if
there is still some value left, this goes to creditors from
the previous period and finally to the shareholders.
III. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS.
In all the simulations to be presented, the return on
investment, ρ, was risk-free and equal to 1.0% , the in-
terest rate on interbank borrowing, rb, was 0.5, χ, the
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equity:deposit ratio was 30%, the period of maturity τ
was set at 3 and the recovery rate γ was set at 0. Pa-
rameters which vary across the reported simulations are
identified separately.
At t = 0 each bank holds deposits, A0, worth 1000
units and initial equity, V0, equal to 0.3 times the initial
deposit.
Initially, A¯k and ω¯k were chosen as identical for each
bank. This led to homogeneity in average size of deposits
and investment opportunities across banks.
Figure 1 displays results on the main question of the
paper. It compares bank failures with different degrees
of linkage, c, in the interbank market. Increasing linkage
adds stability, in the sense that in any period, there are
more surviving banks the greater the degree of linkage.
This pattern was very robust to changing the parameters
of the simulation.
A policy issue raised by the results of Figure 1 concerns
the role of statutory reserve requirements. By prevent-
ing banks from investing more than a certain fraction of
the deposits placed by customers in the form of illiquid
and/or risky assets, reserve requirements reduce the ex-
posure of individual banks to the risk of failure. But they
also inhibit interbank lending activity. This can reduce
the risk sharing provided by interbank credit and desta-
bilise the system. We conducted experiments along the
lines of those reported in Figure 1 and found that, indeed,
while without any interbank credit higher reserve require-
ments always led to fewer bank failures, with interbank
credit linkages, similar increases in reserve requirements
could increase the incidence of bank failures (see [8]).
In the homogeneous case depicted in Figure 1, episodes
of bank failure affect only a small number of banks at a
time and there appears to be no correlation across the
episodes. This is because there is relatively little bor-
rowing and lending taking place at any time. Even this
small amount appears to save banks which face short run
liquidity problems, but is not enough to generate conta-
gion effects.
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FIG. 1. Surviving banks with different interbank linkages.
To allow for systematically larger volumes of interbank
activity, we try to differentiate banks in a way that some
banks tend to be lenders and others to be borrowers. We
therefore make banks differ according to investment op-
portunities, by choosing: ω¯k = ω¯|zk| with zk ∼ N(0, σω¯).
Given that banks remained identical in terms of their de-
posit fluctuations, a large ω¯k meant that a bank would
invest large amounts and consequently face a greater ex-
posure to liquidity risk. Such a bank would be more likely
to act as a large borrower on the credit market, while for
analogous reasons, a bank with small ω¯k would be more
likely to act as a large lender.
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FIG. 2. Effect of variance in opportunities on failure: 100
percent linkage.
Figures 2 and 3 show some of the results from this
experiment. Figure 2 shows the effect of greater hetero-
geneity on the incidence of bank failures when banks are
100 percent connected to each other. As the variance of
types increases from 5 to 40, the incidence of failures goes
up. Note that now the time path shows ‘avalanches’, i.e.
many banks collapse together over brief periods of time.
Since the aggregate environment is on average constant,
avalanches suggest that knock-on effects are taking place.
Figure 3 shows that, fixing the variance of types at 10,
increasing connectivity from 5 to 50 percent leads to less
failures during the interval studied, but increasing con-
nectivity to 80 percent leads to more failures than at 50
percent. Hence, in contrast to the case of homogeneous
banks, increasing the extent of the interbank market need
not increase overall stability.
We repeated the experiments discussed in Figures 2
and 3 by differentiating banks both in terms of size and in
terms of investment opportunity, as follows: A¯k = A¯|zk|,
and ω¯k = ω¯|zk|, with zk ∼ N(0, σω¯). With this formu-
lation, all banks face the same liquidity risk, but het-
erogeneity exists in the volume of borrowing and lending
by different banks. A big borrowing bank might need to
contact many small lending banks and a big lending bank
might be a source of liquidity to many small banks. In
both cases, the collapse of a big bank can create ripples
through the system. The simulation results verified that
this indeed does happen [8]. These results are also con-
sistent with empirical observations made in the literature
(see, e.g., [1,5]).
3
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
t
0
100
200
300
400
N
(t)
c=100
c=10
c=50
c=5
c=80
FIG. 3. Effect of increasing linkages on failure; heteroge-
neous investment opportunities.
The results suggest that when banks are heterogeneous
in the volume of their activity on the interbank mar-
ket, contagion effects can arise which can undermine the
overall risk sharing influence of interbank credit. It is
interesting to observe that heterogeneity plays a similar
role in a well known physical model, the Random Field
Ising Model (RFIM). In particular, the RFIM shows a
’disorder’ induced phase transition between a regime dis-
playing only finite size avalanches and a regime corre-
sponding to avalanches which cover the whole system.
At a critical level of disorder, avalanches of all sizes, up
to and including the system as a whole, may occur. The
statistical distribution of avalanches takes the form of a
power-law at the critical value [9].
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FIG. 4. Log-log plot of the statistical distribution of
avalanche size.
A similar phase transition is found in our model. For
example, Figure 4 shows that when linkages are fixed at
100 percent and setting σω¯ = 40, the system reaches a
critical state where the size of avalanches becomes dis-
tributed according to a power-law. In order to better
identify this power-law behaviour, we increased the num-
ber of banks to 1600 and repeated the simulations sev-
eral times, resampling the investment opportunities each
time. A preliminary investigation indicates that for each
value of linkage across banks, it is possible to find a crit-
ical value of heterogeneity in the system which leads to
power-law distributions of avalanches sizes. The variance
of sizes needed to attain the power-law distribution in-
creases as the connectivity decreases.
IV. CONCLUSIONS:
Our simulations have identified certain characteris-
tics which can lead interbank lending to be associated
with complex forms of instability in a banking system.
Whether or not the crises which periodically grip ac-
tual banking systems represent such complex behaviour
is difficult to establish empirically. The data needs for
such measurement outstrip the recorded evidence on the
subject. It is nonetheless useful for policy makers to be
able to distinguish circumstances under which interbank
credit can destabilise a system from those under which
it stabilises. In this respect, our simulations suggest that
when bank lending is extended across banks which are
heterogeneous in size and risk exposure, it can exarce-
bate the potential for avalanche effects and destabilise
the system.
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